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On a late June afternoon, hundreds of spectators sat
waiting in the yellow heat beneath a big-top tent.
Young couplesfanned children with folded programs and
craned to see any movement on stage. Finally as organ
musicfilled the tent, the masterofceremonies ascended the
stage and barkedgreetings into the microphone. Thecrowd
was captivated. But this was not the circus they had come
to see. This was Resolution Trust Corporation 's Afford-
able Housing Program!
Since the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) took
its first steps toward implementing the Affordable Housing
Disposition Program in 1989, housing advocates, con-
gressional sponsors, and the press have lambasted the
agency's efforts to reconcile the competing statutory
objectives of the program. In recent months, criticism of
the program has been calmed somewhat by the RTC's
success at moving huge numbers of low-priced homes in
highly publicized public auctions. Unlike the RTC's
earlier attempts to dispose of its affordable housing
inventory, the auctions have been spared most criticism,
attracting instead the fanfare and hyperbole of a big-top
circus coming to town.
As part of its sales blitzkrieg covering the Northeast,
Southeast, and Southwest, the RTC sponsored a series
of real estate auctions in North Carolina's Research
Triangle Park in late June 1991. All of the properties,
ranging from undeveloped land to small shopping cen-
ters, were taken from the real-estate-owned inventories
of Raleigh's failed First Federal Savings and Loan. The
107 properties eligible for the Affordable Housing Dis-
position Program were sold during to two days of auc-
tioning. Under the program, low-priced single-family
and multi-family homes are separated from other assets
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and marketed for 90 days solely to low- and moderate-
income households, nonprofits, and public agencies.
According to its own criteria, the RTC considered the
North Carolina affordable housing auction a smashing
success.
The question remains whether the auction was a
success when measured in terms set by statute, housing
advocates, public agencies, and the buyers themselves.
How Bank Regulators Became Housing
Providers
In early 1989, President Bush unveiled a comprehen-
sive plan to resolve the crisis in the thrift industry and, in
Bush's words, "to promote a safe and stable system of af-
fordable housing finance through regulatory reform."
The President's bill was sent for review to the House
banking committee, chaired by Rep. Henry Gonzalez
(D-Texas). A stalwart advocate of affordable housing,
Gonzalez had witnessed a dramatic decline in conven-
tional housing assistance from the federal government
during the Reagan Administration. Federal budget au-
thorizations for housing had fallen from 5.2 percent of
total budget authority during the Carter Administration
to just 0.73 percent in Reagan's 1989 budget (then still
in effect). 1 When the President's bill emerged from the
banking committee it carried an amendment creating a
90-day right of first refusal for low-income families and
nonprofit and public agencies on low-cost properties
held by failed Savings & Loan institutions (S&Ls). The
amendment met immediate opposition from the Ad-
ministration which foresaw delay and increased costs
resulting from the affordable housing provisions.
In response, Democrats in the House and Senate
cited three justifications for attaching housing provi-
sions to the bailout bill. First, Democrats would support
the President ifthe statute were structured not simply as
a bailout, but also as a restatement of industry objec-
tives. Second, the housing program would be a means of
giving otherwise wasted properties back to the taxpayers
asked to fund bailout. Third, directing the properties to
marginal families now would prevent the government
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from having to pay housing subsidies for the same fami-
lies in the long run.
With the cost of the bailout was growing an estimated
S20 to $30 million every day, President Bush relented,
and on August 9, 1989, signed into law an amended
version of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act (FIRREA).2 The Resolution Trust
Corporation and its Affordable Housing Disposition
Program were born.
An Affordable Housing Program in a Hostile
Agency
The mission of the RTC is to manage and resolve
failed thrifts and to dispose of any residual assets that
result from resolution. In retrospect, perhaps the great-
est error of FIRREA's drafters was the attention given
to resolution of thrifts instead of asset disposition. Al-
though the RTCoperates under thesupervision ofan in-
dependent oversight board, the RTC's "exclusive man-
ager" is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC). Traditionally, the focus of the FDIC was to
consult with and preserve a troubled institution and,
only rarely, to attempt to sell the institution as a whole.
This tradition has had a profound impact on the RTC's
ability to discharge its duty as a seller of individual, low-
value assets.
Also complicating the RTC's mission are Congress'
three seemingly contradictory mandates. FIRREA re-
quires that the RTC dispose of residual assets in a
manner that maximizes return and minimizes losses to
taxpayers; minimizes the impact on local real estate and
financial markets; and maximizes the preservation of
the availability and affordability of residential properly
for low- and moderate-income individuals.3 Through-
out the process of translating Congress' intent in the
Affordable Housing Disposition Program into work-
able regulations and procedures, RTC staffand housing
proponents have continually butted heads over how to
balance these mixed mandates.
The efforts of the RTC to implement FIRREA's
housing provisions were further undermined by a staff
that was ideologically unsuited to the task of providing
affordable housing. The former bank regulators who
staffed the RTC were unversed at breaking up an S&L
and selling its properties. They werealso uninterested in
protecting low-cost homes from real estate investors
and marketing them to low- and moderate-income families.
More than a year after the RTC's start-up, affordable
housing sponsor Barney Frank complained that RTC
officials "were offended at the notion that they should be
worrying about poor people. They didn't want to be a
social agency, having responsibilities that would inter-
fere with their high finance."4 As the housing program
has grown, however, the RTC has hired a multitude of
workers from other government programs serving the
poor.
Outline of the Program
Under FIRREA and subsequent amendments, the
Affordable Housing Disposition Program requires that
the RTC give a 90-day right of first refusal on "eligible
properties" to "qualified purchasers." If the RTC does
not receive an acceptable offer during the 90-day period,
it may sell the property on the open market.
FIRREA defines qualified purchasers as households
earning no more than 115 percent of the area median
income, as well as nonprofit organizations or public
The efforts of the RTC to implement FIRREA's
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agencies. Eligibility guidelines for properties are the
same as those found in sections 203(b)(2) and 221 (d)(ii)
of the National Housing Act. One-unit dwellings may
not have an appraised value of more than $67,500; two-
unit dwellings, not more than $76,000; and three-unit
dwellings, not more than $92,000. Multi-family housing
may have a maximum appraised value of $29,000 to
$58,392, depending on the number of bedrooms.
Qualifying households may purchase single-family
homes subjct to a commitment to occupy the homes as
their principle residence for at least one year. The RTC
may recapture 75 percent of profits if a home is sold
prematurely and without good cause. Qualifying agen-
cies and nonprofits must agree to rent or resell single-
family homes to families earning no more than 80 per-
cent of the area median income. When purchasing multi-
family properties, agencies and non-profits must reserve
at least 20 percent of the units for very low-income ten-
ants, defined as households earning no more than one-
half the area median. An additional 20 percent of the
units must be reserved for low-income tenants, or those
earning 80 percent of the area median. These percent-
ages apply in the aggregate to all complexes purchased,
which allows for some segregation of low-income ten-
ants in a few buildings. To prevent drastic segregation,
Congress has recently amended program guidelines to
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require at least a ten percent low-income presence in all
buildings purchased. The program also limits rent paid
by low- and very low-income families to roughly 30
percent of their incomes.
The 90-day marketing period operates slightly differ-
ently for single-family and multi-family properties.
Marketing of single-family residences is confined to the
90-day period, during which time the RTC considers
bids on a first-come-first-served basis. When choosing
between substantially similar offers, the RTC gives first
preference to households, second preference to non-
Out of all sales functions, however, it is in mar-
keting that the RTC has best earned its new
nickname, ''Ready to Change.
"
profits, and last preference to public agencies. After
the 90-day period, all restrictions on sales are lifted.
For multi-family properties, the RTC will only accept
written "notice of serious intent" from qualifying pur-
chasers during the period. After 90 days, organizations
have an additional 45 days to submit a bona fide offer.
The RTC then chooses the best offer or, in the event of
a tie, the offer that guarantees the highest percentage of
low-income residency. In contrast to the single-family
rules, even if eligible multi-family properties pass through
the protective marketing period unsold, residency re-
strictions remain effective against future for-profit pur-
chasers.
FIRREA created clearinghouses to act as informa-
tion conduits between the RTC and qualifying purchas-
ers. These may include state housing finance agencies,
district Federal Home Loan Banks, or national non-
profits approved by the RTC. Originally, the RTC
Oversight Board did not contemplate that clearing-
houses would participate in marketing beyond dissemi-
nating of information. By contrast, the Oversight Board
has created technical assistance advisors to help more
actively in matching purchasers, properties, and financ-
ing. The RTC may also enter into agreements with
private real estate brokers, auctioneers, and bulk-sales
specialists.
RTC Under Fire
From the outset the RTC and its housing program
were beset by problems that FIRREA's drafters did not
anticipate. Many S&Ls taken over had kept confusing
and incomplete records, which made the process of
securing title to foreclosed property long and cumber-
some. To its later regret, the RTC chose to assign
properties to its regional and consolidated offices based
on the location of the thrift that had secured the prop-
erty rather than the location ofthe property itself. Given
the geographic dispersion of investments by failed thrifts,
all fourteen consolidated offices maywell be responsible
for properties in Dallas, for example. At the same time,
the RTC gave branch offices very little authority to
approve sales. Regional offices independently could
only dispose of assets with book values of less than
$25,000; consolidated office staffcould only sell proper-
ties worth less than $10,000.5
The most persistent pitfalls within the affordable
housing program, however, have been caused not by
statutory or organizational limitations, but by the in-
transigence of the RTC Oversight Board. Until early
1991, the board refused to liberalize policies on price
discounting, seller financing, or marketing as permitted
by statute. In each area the board justified its position by
arguing that Congress' first two mandates ofmaximizing
the return to taxpayers and minimizing the impact of
RTC sales on local markets, outweighed Congress' third
mandate, to maximize the availability of affordable housing.
Harangued by congressional sponsors and housing
advocates, the RTC grudgingly has made concessions.
Ironically, the open market has been the force behind
the most progressive policy changes in the program.
Changes in Pricing, Seller-Financing, and
Marketing
The conundrum of the affordable housing program's
conflicting mandates is nowhere more obvious than in
pricing policy, yet pricing is the puzzle that the RTC, as
the offspring of the FDIC, is least equipped to solve.
FIRREA allows for discounting to the extent necessary
to make housing sales to lower-income families and
nonprofit or public agencies feasible. Still, the RTC did
not allow price discounting when affordable housing
sales began in early 1990. In May 1990, the oversight
board allowed properties to be discounted by 15 percent
after four months of marketing-one month after quali-
fying purchasers lost their 90-day right of first refusal.
Predictably, sales prices throughout the program's first
several months averaged just under 100 percent of
appraised value, or S42,000.6 Not until discounts were
increased to 20 percent after "some reasonable market-
ing" did sales prices drop to 93 percent of appraised
value, or $35,700, during the last quarter of 1990.7
The pressure to liberalize discounting policies in-
creased through early 1991 and culminated in an amend-
ment to FIRREA that allowed the RTC to set prices on
single-family properties without regard to any minimum
purchase price.8 Although housing advocates lobbied
the RTC on ideological grounds, the economics of car-
rying costs provided a far stronger argument for dis-
counting. Using the carrying costs on HUD-foreclosed
homes as a proxy, theRTC incurs about $18.25 a day on
each eligible property.9 With 7,500 single-family homes
in the program in May 1991, the RTC was paying about
$137,000 per day to carry its inventory. Probably more in
response to these costs than to the calls of housing advo-
cates, theRTC began to sell homes at deep discounts. By
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the end of August 1991, the average price of a single-
family home had dropped below $25,000, or just 67.4
percent of appraised value. 10
Seller-financing has developed at much the same
pace as pricing policy, slowly at first, but more rapidly of
late. Because Congress had notice from Housing and
Urban Development, Farmer's Home Administration,
and Veteran's Administration housing programs that
seller-financing would be a necessary evil of selling to
qualifying families and nonprofits, FIRREA allowed
below-market-rate mortgages to be taken by the RTC
on affordable properties. However, in its "Strategic Plan
for the RTC," the oversight board viewed seller-financ-
ing as a marketing tool to be used onlywhen banks would
not lend and only if the cost of financing is offset by a
higher purchase price. In early 1990, the board imposed
a requirement that all seller-financed loans be salable on
the secondary market within one year, effectively pre-
cluding the use of flexible underwriting standards with
low-income buyers. Finally, more than a year into the
program, the oversight board approved up to $250 mil-
lion in seller-financing for eligible properties with 5
percent down payments and below-market interest rates
for families who were already renting the homes they
would buy.
Even since the agency's change of heart, financing
arranged by the RTC has been slow to materialize
because of organizational delays. Sales of securitized
packages of nonconforming mortgages required an
amendment to FIRREA, granting RTC employees
immunity from securities violations. Reservations of
mortgage revenue bonds issued by state housing agen-
cies resulted in commitments of almost $200 million by
August 1991, though gun-shy banks in the Southwest
had been willing to lend only a fraction of that amount.
Wary of becoming a long-term lender because its statu-
tory life extends only to 1996, the RTC currently will
finance sales only when no private lender comes for-
ward. The RTC almost always avoids that situation by
enticing first-mortgage lenders with "soft second"
mortgages of 5 to 20 percent of the sales price.
Out of all sales functions, however, it is in marketing
that the RTC has best earned its new nickname, "Ready
to Change." At the close of 1990, the RTC took stock of
its efforts and found that 75 percent of its properties in
number represented only 10 percent of the dollar value
of its inventory and that only one percent of the RTC's
proceeds were derived from affordable housing sales. 11
The RTCwas acquiring low-value properties at approxi-
mately three times the rate it was selling them. 12 In
response, the agency set a goal of selling 80 percent of its
properties worth less than $100,000 by June 30, 1991. 13
In order to meet its goal, the RTC planned more than
100 sales events to dispose of 9,000 affordable proper-
ties throughout the Northeast, Southeast, and South-
westduringl991.Ataffordablehousingfairs, theagency
prequalified families on the spot and provided informa-
tion about area properties and financing. At silent auc-
tions, qualifying families submitted sealed bids on ad-
vertised homes. At absolute auctions, such as the one
staged in North Carolina, competitive bidding began at
$5 and continued until every property on the block was
sold. To support these events, the RTCsigned contracts
with nearly 100 government agencies and nonprofits to
act as clearinghouses and technical assistance advisors.
The RTC set up booths offering bilingual services in
Houston supermarkets and at the Texas state fair. The
agency began publishing its own newsletter, The Silver
Lining, for bankers, nonprofits, local governments, and
brokers. Even high school cheerleaders and bands were
recruited to perform at auctions.
The RTC met its goal. By June 30, 1991, contracts had
been signed on 85 percent of the 5,200'single-family
homes that were on the books at the end of 1990. As
those who prepared for or participated in the North
Carolina auction can attest, the pace of sales was stag-
gering. When the RTC approached the North Carolina
Housing Finance Agency (NCHFA) in late May about
hosting the auction, the RTC had experienced an 80
percent increase in sales during the preceding month.
Preparation for the North Carolina
Affordable Housing Auction
The affordable housing auction held in Research
Triangle Park on June 22 and 23, 1991 was among the
first auctions sponsored by the RTC Mid-Atlantic Con-
solidated Office in Atlanta. NCHFA, which had previ-
ously contracted to act as an RTC clearinghouse, was
given notice of the auction just four weeks before the
first bids were cast. The RTC offered some support out
of Atlanta, but responsibility for publicity, bidder pre-
qualification, and inventory preparation fell mainly on
Hudson & Marshall, the Georgia auction company under
contract with the RTC; First Federal Savings & Loan,
the Raleigh S&L which owned all the real estate to be
auctioned off; and NCHFA. NCHFA in turn contracted
out much of the prequalification of buyers to the Down-
town Housing Improvement Corporation of Raleigh,
the Durham Affordable Housing Coalition, and the
Orange Community Housing Corporation.
Even before the auction team knew the size of the
inventory or the financing available, newspaper and
Table 2. The North Carolina Auction in a Nutshell
Dates June 22-23, 1991
Number of Properties Sold 99
Average Appraised Value $67,720
Average Sales Price $54,300
Average Buyer Income $30,170
Bids per Property (Approximate) 8
Total Proceeds (Preliminary) $5,400,0000
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radio ads were run and stories appeared in the local
press. NCHFAset up a toll-free phone line to receive in-
quiries, and Hudson & Marshall scrambled to print-up
a brochure for distribution. The RTC gauged that 300
prequalified bidders would be needed to support sales
comparable to previous auctions. Instead, NCHFA was
swamped with more than 2,000 inquiries, resulting in
1,000 families interviewed and 800 prequalified to bid.
Hudson & Marshall sponsored a "buyer's awareness
preview" outside Raleigh a week before the event to
familiarize bidders with the properties and the auction
process; the crowds were five times that expected, back-
ing up traffic all the way to Interstate 40.
Prequalification interviews for bidders lasted thirty
minutes and consisted ofthree steps. Staffdetermined if
the income figures supplied by the family fell below the
program limit of 1 15 percent of the area median, which
in the North Carolina auction ranged from $35,150 for
a single-person household to $50,250 for a family of
four. Very few families exceeded the limits. Second, staff
calculated the maximum bid a family could offer based
on their income, current debts, and financing available.
Finally, staff attempted to answer questions about the
auction process and the homes available. Unfortunately,
prequalifiers had little information to offer. Virtually
nothing was known about the properties other than
their location and size and that many were new townhouses
built by bankrupt developers. Though no inspections
were performed, prequalifiers learned that some homes
still lacked carpeting or bathtubs. RTC policy prevented
bidders from learning the appraised values of the prop-
erties.
Two financing packages were available to bidders.
The RTC was willing to provide 30-year, fixed-rate
mortgages at 9.75 percent to purchasers who could not
find private financing. Families earning below 80 per-
cent of the area median income would pay 3 percent
down; other qualifying purchasers would pay 5 percent
down. The RTC would pay all closing costs and mort-
80-100% of Median
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gage insurance, leaving buyers to pay property taxes,
title insurance, and homeowner's dues. NCHFA had re-
served $500,000 for first-time home buyers who earned
less than 80 percent of the median income. The NCHFA's
15-year, fixed-rate financing of 80 percent of the sales
price could be combined with a second mortgage from
the RTC for 15 percent of the price on the same terms.
Winning bidders were not required to use either RTC or
NCHFA financing, and it appears few did.
Results of the Auction
The bidders assembled under the big-top tent at the
affordable housing auction could not be described as a
crowd of welfare recipients or "the working poor," nor
were they a herd of disguised yuppies. It appeared that
theRTC had achieved the same economic and racial mix
that characterized earlier fields of bidders in Boston,
Savannah, and Austin. However, winning bidders at the
North Carolina auction appear to have been decidedly
more middle-class than RTC buyers nationwide. Pre-
liminary results of the auction show the average income
of a North Carolina buyer was $30,500, or 87 percent of
the area median. 14 For the first twelve auctions in the
mid-Atlantic region, buyer income averaged $23,900, or
69 percent ofthe area median. 15 Nationwide in June, the
averagebuyer incomes was just $23,200, or 61 percent of
the national median. 16
The jump in incomes of North Carolina buyers is
partly attributable to the quality of the housing sold.
Whereas homes sold in Savannah required major struc-
tural repairs and New Orleans properties were being
used as crack houses, most North Carolina properties
were recently constructed in healthy neighborhoods.
Still, price as a percentage of appraised value, which
should remain constant, was slightly higher in North
Carolina than in other regions. Although in June the
RTC was collecting under 78 percent ofappraised value
nationwide, 17 properties in June's auction sold for 80.2
percent of appraised value. 18 The $5.4 million in bids
that the RTC accepted at the
auction set a record for af-
fordable housing sales, rep-
resenting a whopping 105








Figure 1. Income of Buyers as a Percentage of Median Income
Conclusion: Is the RTC
Fulfilling Its Mandate?
After the North Carolina
auction drew to a close and
the big-top tent was rolled up
for transport to the next town,
one had to wonder if this was
what Congress had in mind




Program. Strange as its means were, had the RTC finally
managed to reconcile its competing statutory mandates?
There is no doubt that the auction strategy serves the
program's first goal of maximizing the return to taxpay-
ers on the sale of properties. To illustrate, the RTC
settled for 87 percent of appraised value on single-fam-
ily homes at the June auction. Prior to using auctions,
the RTC was recovering about 96 percent of appraised
value. However, had the North Carolina properties
been marketed individually, the carrying costs incurred
in just six months would have reduced the RTC's net
proceeds to the 86 percent recovered in June. Through
the auction, the RTC was rid of most properties in a
matter of weeks. Speedy disposition of properties is
even more necessary now that Congress has made single-
family properties in conservatorship, as well as receiver-
ship, permanently eligible for the affordable housing
program. The change will roughly double the number of
units in the program's inventory.
The goal of minimizing the impact of RTC sales on
local real estate markets is also probably served by the
auctions. Prior to FIRREA's passage, brokers and de-
velopers feared that if the RTC dumped its real estate
there would be a sharp drop in local prices. The real evil
has turned out to be the uncertainty that takes hold of
local markets when the RTC delays disposition of its
huge inventories. The sentiment among builders and
economists now seems to be, "Go ahead and get it over
with." 19
Whether auctions serve the last goal of maximizing
affordable housing opportunities is, of course, the issue
no one agrees on. By the words of the statute, the RTC
easily meets its mandate: FIRREA requires sales to
families below 115 percent of the national median, and
in August the RTCwas selling its single-family homes to
households earning an average of 59 percent of the
national median20 The Low Income Housing Informa-
tion Service has cast serious doubt on the accuracy of the
RTC's reports,21 but even so, the RTC has a 50 percent
margin ofsafety on its income levels. Most objections to
the program, therefore, are aimed at the way the RTC
sells its affordable housing. The auction is a classic
example of a forum where truly low-income families are
easily muscled out by the middle-class or by households
whose incomes understate theiractual upward mobility.
The disparity in buying power is more pronounced in
situations where almost no information is provided on
the homes to be sold.
As the RTC has struggled to implement the afford-
able housing program, it has been subjected to a double
standard - one based on the lenient income limits of
FIRREA and the other based on the potential that
housing advocates see for providing affordable homes.
After a year of auctions, the RTC has lost most of its
illusions of being able to sell 1,000 properties a month,
all at near-market prices. By the same token, the pro-
gram's detractors have become more realistic about the
RTC's capacity for doing good. Soon after the North
Carolina auction, program sponsor Rep. Barney Frank
conceded, "We have got to compare [the program] with
perfection on the one hand and nonexistence on the
other."22
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